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Court Dictation of Choice of Anesthesia
Carl E. Wasmuth, M. D.*
NCREDIBLE AS IT SEEMS, the courts of one of the foremost States
of the Nation (California), have effectively overruled medical
experts as to a medical "fact of life." The court has said, in effect,
that it (rather than scientific experts) will decide what anesthesia
should or should not be used by anesthesiologists. How such a
thing could happen is most interesting to see. It came about
thus:
In malpractice cases against doctors (physicians and sur-
geons), negligence ordinarily is not presumed but must be
proved.1 The burden of the proof is upon the plaintiff to show
that the defendant lacked the proper knowledge and skill2 or
failed to use that degree of care ordinarily exercised by doctors
under similar circumstances," and all this proof must be estab-
lished by expert testimony. Generally speaking, a physician or a
surgeon is presumed to have treated or to have operated upon his
patient carefully and skillfully. 4 Except-when the Doctrine of
Res Ipsa Loquitur applies. That doctrine is a weird and wonder-
ful thing, sometimes.
Indeed, the law ordinarily does not look upon the doctor as a
guarantor of good results, and usually no presumption of negli-
Member of the Staff in the Department of Anesthesiology of The Cleve-
land Clinic Foundation. f-e holds degrees of Bachelor of Science and of
Doctor of Medicine, both from University of Pittsburgh. He is a Fellow of
the American College of Anesthesiology, a Diplomate of the American
Board of Anesthesiology, and a third year student at Cleveland-Marshall
Law School.
1 "In cases involving charges of malpractice against a professional man,
negligence will not be presumed but must be proved." Hine v. Fox, 89 S.
2d 13 (Fla., 1956).
2 The burden of proof is upon the plaintiff in action for malpractice, to
show a want of proper knowiedge and skill. The doctrine of res ipsa loquitur
does not apply in malpractice actions and negligence cannot be inferred
from the occurrence alone. Bettigole v. Diener, 124 A. 2d 265 (Md., 1956).
3 In malpractice actions, in absence of a res ipsa loquitur situation, plaintiff
must offer proof that defendant doctor failed to use that degree of care or-
dinarily exercised by other doctors under similar circumstances and testi-
mony must be produced from qualified experts. Warren v. 13oos, 273 P. 2d
569 (C. A. Calif., 1954).
4 "Generally, a physician or surgeon is presumed to have carefully and
skillfully treated or operated on his patient, and no presumption of negli-
gence is to be indulged from fact. of injury to patient or adverse result of
treatment or operation." Waddell v. Woods, 158 Kan. 469, 148 P. 2d 1016,
152 A. L. R. 629 (1944).
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gence can be inferred from injury to the patient or from an ad-
verse result of treatment or operation. However, certain factual
situations occurring in malpractice cases introduce the application
of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur. This rule of evidence is pecu-
liar to the law of negligence and permits the jury under proper
instruction to draw an inference of negligence.5 It virtually is a
qualification of the general rule that negligence is never pre-
sumed but must be affirmatively proved.6 Such an inference
throws upon the party charged the duty of producing evidence to
overcome the inference created. The application of the doctrine
of res ipsa loquitur in a malpractice case involving spinal anes-
thesia7 has caused far-reaching effects in the practice of anes-
thesiology.
The term res ipsa loquitur was first used by Baron Pollock
in 1863s when the now-famous barrel fell from the second floor
of a warehouse, injuring a passer-by in the street below. Origi-
nally the doctrine required:
a) That there must be a reasonable evidence of negligence.
5 The rule of res ipsa loquitur is a rule of evidence which permits the in-
ference of negligence where an accident occurs under circumstances which,
in the ordinary course of human experience, would not happen but for the
negligence of defendant and is but an evidential inference for the jury's
consideration under proper instructions. Carpenter v. Baltimore and O-R.
Co., 109 F. 2d 375 (C. C. A. 6, Ohio, 1940).
Res ipsa loquitur doctrine is not a substantive rule of law, but a rule of
evidence which permits jury, but not the court unless the court is the tryer
of facts, to draw an inference of negligence, where instrumentality causing
injuries is under exclusive management and control of one of the parties
and accident occurs under circumstances where in ordinary care of events
it would not occur when ordinary care is observed. Fink v. N. Y. Central
R. R., 144 Ohio St. 1, 56 N. E. 2d 456 (1944).
6 "Res ipsa loquitur is a rule of evidence peculiar to the law of negligence,
and amounts to qualification of the general rule that negligence is never
presumed but must be affirmatively proved." Weller v. Worstall, 129 Ohio
St. 596, 196 N. E. 637 (1935).
The underlying reason for the rule of res ipsa loquitur is that facts of
injury are solely within knowledge of the defendant and are not accessible
to the plaintiff, founded on absence of specific proof of acts or omission
constituting negligence. Rosper v. Old Fort Mills, 81 Ohio App. 241, 78
N. E. 2d 909 (1947).
In action for alleged malpractice, the breaking of a needle used to ad-
minister a spinal anesthetic does not permit the application of the rule of
evidence known as res ipsa loquitur, but proof of the breaking of the needle
coupled with its location outside of the channel of soft tissue and against
the bone gave rise to a prima facie case of negligence sufficient to call upon
the defendant anesthetist for an explanation. Wiley v. Wharton, 68 Ohio
App. 345, 41 N. E. 2d 255 (1941).
7 Seneris v. Haas, 291 P. 2d 915 (Calif., 1955).
8 Byrne v. Boadle, 2 H & C 722, 159 Eng. Rep. 299 (1863).
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b) That the thing must be under control of defendant or his
servant.
c) That the accident is one which does not occur if the one
in possession uses proper care.
If these requirements are met, the facts afford reasonable evi-
dence that the accident arose from want of care. 9 In effect, the
doctrine is comparable to circumstantial evidence in an unusual
accident.10 In most states the doctrine usually is applied in mal-
practice cases only when the facts possess an air of the dramatic,
and when negligence is evident to the layman without the testi-
mony of an expert.
In the usual malpractice case, negligence must be affirma-
tively proved by testimony of an expert. The physician must have
done something in diagnosis or treatment of his patient which
the recognized standard of medical practice of his community
forbids, or he must have neglected to do something required by
that standard.1 ' Such testimony must be produced by qualified
experts. 12 The fact that the patient has an unfavorable reaction
to certain therapy does not make the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur
applicable 3 nor does it give rise to an inference of negligence.'
4
9 Seatt v. London & St. Katherine Docks Co., 3 H & C 596, 159 Eng. Rep.
665 (1865): "There must be reasonable evidence. But where the thing is
shown to be under the management of the defendant or his servants and
the accident is such as in the ordinary course of things does not happen if
those who have the management use proper care, it affords reasonable evi-
dence, in the absence of explanation by the defendants that the accident
arose from want of care."
10 Prosser, Res Ipsa Loquitur in California, 37 Calif. L. R. 183 (1949).
11 Before a physician or surgeon may be held liable for malpractice, he
must have done something in the treatment of his patient which the recog-
nized standards of medical practice of the community forbids in such cases,
or he must have neglected to do something required by that standard.
Woods v. Pommerening, 271 P. 2d 705 (Wash., 1954).
12 See above, n. 3.
13 In malpractice action by patient against physician, who prescribed medi-
cine containing arsenic, which allegedly poisoned patient, if treatment pre-
scribed by physician was an approved and acceptable treatment and dosages
prescribed were proper, mere fact that patient had an unfavorable reaction
from use of medicine would not make doctrine of res ipsa loquitur appli-
cable, nor would it be sulfficient to establish actionable negligence against
physician. Hawkins v. McCain, 239 N. C. 160, 79 S. E. 2d 493 (1954).
Res ipsa loquitur doctrine was inapplicable in action against surgeon
for malpractice in continuing operation on plaintiff after he suffered first
of four electrical shocks caused by short circuit in elect'o surgical unit
used for operation. Smith v. American Cystoscope Makers, Inc., 266 P. 2d
792 (Wash., 1954).
14 When a physician undertakes to perform duties of his profession he
impliedly warrants that le possesses and will use the requisite skill and
(Continued on next page)
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This fundamental rule is based on the likelihood that the lack
of success may be attributed to causes other than the physician's
negligence.' 5
The doctrine of res ipsa loquitur usually has been applied to
malpractice cases in certain factual situations. These include:
instances when sponges and instruments are left in the abdomi-
nal cavity; when teeth are knocked out during tonsillectomy;
when a wrong tooth is pulled; when burns are produced by hot
water bottles on an untreated area of the body; or, when the
wrong leg is amputated. Such factual situations do not require
expert testimony because the negligence involved is said to be
within the experience and knowledge of the layman.1" However,
the accident must have been of a kind that ordinarily does not
occur in the absence of someone's negligence. It must have been
caused by an agency or instrumentality within the exclusive
control of the defendant and must not have been due to any
(Continued from preceding page)
care ordinarily possessed and used by others in his profession, but unsuc-
cessful results of his treatment do not give rise to a presumption of negli-
gence. Rainey v. Horn, 72 S. 2d 434 (Miss., 1954).
15 The application of the doctrine to malpractice cases is somewhat limited,
since most courts follow the rule that negligence of a physician will not be
inferred or presumed merely because of adverse results in medical treat-
ment. Note, 26 Ill. L. R. 350 (1930). The reason upon which this rule is
founded seems to be in the likelihood that the lack of success may be
attributable to causes other than the physician's negligence. Malila v.
Meacham, 187 Ore. 330, 211 P. 2d 747 (1949). But there are certain factual
situations in which there is a growing tendency to extend the doctrine into
malpractice. Ybarra v. Spangard, 25 Cal. 2d 486, 154 P. 2d 687, 162 A. L. R.
1258; Noted, 25 B. U. L. R. 295, 33 Calif. L. R. 331 (1944); 18 So. Calif. L. R.
310 (1944).
"To extend the doctrine to a situation where a series of people are
seriatim in control or in partial control of the plaintiff or his things and
where the injury may have occurred by the act of any one of them unob-
served by the others, is using the doctrine to accomplish a result without
reference to the reasons for it or its limitations. It is not equitable to impose
liability upon all members of the group when it is evident that the harm
was not result of group action and that most of the members of the group
were innocent of wrongdoing." Seavey, Res Ipsa Loq.: Tabula in Naufragio,
63 Harv. L. R. 643 (1950).
Courts have often refused to apply doctrine when exclusive control by
defendant was questionable. (Injury to eye during or after appendectomy)
Meadows v. Patterson, 21 Tenn. App. 282, 109 S. W. 2d 417 (1937); (Injury
to neck and spine during T&A) Beckwith v. Boynton, 235 111. App. 469 (1924).
"The basis of the decision appears quite clearly to be a burden imposed
upon defendant because of their special responsibility towards the plaintiff,
which in reality has very little to do with the ordinary notion of res ipsa
loquitur." Note, 33 Oregon L. R. 236 (1954).
16 Walker v. Distler, 296 P. 2d 452 (Idaho, 1956).
A plaintiff may invoke the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur in certain mal-
practice cases, as where the surgeon has left a foreign object in the body of
a patient, because in those cases the negligence involved is said to be within
the experience and knowledge of layman.
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voluntary action or contribution on the part of the plaintiff. 17
Some texts state that the doctrine throws upon the party charged,
the duty of producing evidence of the true cause of injury,
whether culpable or innocent, which is accessible to the defend-
ant but inaccessible to the person injured. It is, in effect, a type
of circumstantial evidence suffcient to take the case to the jury.
However, the nonavailability-of-evidence concept is new and
usually is considered a nonessential requirement.
The doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, where applicable, gives to
the plaintiff a procedural advantage. Its least effect (applicable
in most of the states) would be to create only an inference, or
mere permissible deduction, that the jury may make without
express direction of the court to that effect. This inference at
least sends the case to a jury, but it is not enough to entitle the
plaintiff to a directed verdict.
Most courts frown upon the application of res ipsa loquitur
in medical-malpractice suits, since, in the ordinary malpractice
case, laymen are not qualified to say that the doctor was negli-
gent, but expert testimony is required-testimony that must
originate from another physician or surgeon. Thus, whenever
expert testimony cannot be obtained, an insuperable handicap
is placed upon the plaintiff. To avoid miscarriage of justice, some
courts permit the inference of negligence in certain malpractice
cases, by lay testimony, when the particular factual situations
strongly suggest negligence. Excellent illustrations are the fa-
mous cases of instruments or sponges left in the abdomen. Some
courts, however, extend the doctrine to other medical situations
in which negligence is obvious,1s such as the pulling of the wrong
tooth. "The charitable presumptions which ordinarily protect
the practitioner against legal blame when his treatment is un-
successful are here not available." 19
17 Ybarra v. Spangard, 25 Cal. 2d 486, 154 P. 2d 687, 162 A. L. R. 1258 (1944).
18 "If a surgeon, undertaking to remove a tumor from a person's scalp, lets
his knife slip and cuts off his patient's ear, or if he undertakes to stitch a
wound on the patient's cheek and by an awkward move thrusts his needle
into the patient's eye, or if a dentist in his haste, leaves a decayed tooth in
the jaw of his patient and removes one which is perfectly sound and service-
able, the charitable presumptions, which ordinarily protect the practitioner
against legal blame where his treatment is unsuccessful are here not avail-
able. It is a matter of common knowledge and observation that such things
do not ordinarily attend the service of one possessing skill and experience
in the delicate work of surgery. It does not need scientific knowledge or
understanding to understand that, ordinarily speaking, such results are un-
necessary and are not to be anticipated if reasonable care be exercised by
the operator." Evans v. Roberts, 172 Iowa 653, 154 N. W. 923 (1915).
19 Prosser, Res Ipsa Loquitur in California, 37 Calif. L. R. 183 (1949).
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A problem arises, however, with the occurrence of untoward
reactions to therapy. Physicians are cognizant of the inherent
potentiality-however remote-in every medical or surgical pro-
cedure, that the intended results may not eventuate. Such un-
expected or unexplained results are best relegated to the field of
ignorance or to the realm of the unknown, inasmuch as medicine
is not an exact science. Medical statistics are kept to present to
the physician an undistorted graphic record of the incidence of
success or failure of a particular therapeutic procedure. The
successful results contrast vividly with the less successful. There
is no doubt that the possibility of harmful results influences the
selection of a therapeutic regime. Mills calls the incidence of
untoward results "the calculated risk." 20 He states that the
figures specifically eliminate the element of negligence, and
never should be used as a basis of probability of negligence. Ex-
ception might be taken to the term "calculated risk" as a con-
tradiction in terms. In addition, in medical statistics concerning
the success or failure of a given therapeutic procedure, negligence
is included in the figures. In most instances, when a given pro-
cedure is to be analyzed, a large unselected series of consecutive
cases is studied and the results are tabulated. In such techniques,
negligence may be a complication and of necessity must be in-
cluded in the series. Therefore, such figures may be used to
show the possibility of negligence.
The Supreme Court of California has extended the interpre-
tation of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur in malpractice cases so
that the physician must now be nearly a guarantor of results.
And a review of a few recent, specific cases involving anesthesia
makes it increasingly evident that they may have far-reaching
influence on the practice of anesthesiology. In the case of Ybarra
v. Spangard,21 general anesthesia was administered for an appen-
20 Mills, Res Ipsa Loquitur and the Calculated Risk in Medical Malpractice,
30 So. Calif. L. R. 80 (1956).
21 "In the face of these examples of liberalization of the tests for res ipsa
loquitur, there can be no justification for the rejection of the doctrine in the
instant case. As pointed out above if we accept the contention of defendants
herein there will rarely be any compensation for patients injured while un-
conscious. A hospital today conducts a highly integrated system of activities,
with many persons contributing their efforts. There may be, e.g., prepara-
tion for surgery by nurses and interns who are employees of the hospital;
administering of an anesthetic by a doctor who may be an employee of the
hospital, an employee of the operating surgeon, or an independent con-
tractor; performance of an operation by a surgeon and assistant who may
be his employees, employees of the hospital, or independent contractors; and
presurgical care by the surgeon, or hospital physician, and nurses. The
number of those in whose care the patient is placed is not a good reason for
(Continued on next page)
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dectomy. During this operation, the patient sustained an injury
to the right shoulder. This was an injury to a healthy part of the
body not the subject of treatment, nor within the area covered by
the operation. The California Supreme Court held that such an
injury raises the inference of negligence and calls upon the de-
fendant physician to explain the unusual result.
The court felt that inasmuch as the patient was rendered
unconscious and incapable of knowing who treated him negli-
gently, everyone concerned with the hospital treatment (while
the plaintiff was in the unconscious state) should be held as
parties defendant. It was incumbent upon each to show that due
care and skill was exercised and that he was not negligent in
the treatment of the patient. This is based upon the element of
the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur that defendants have the superior
knowledge or have access to superior knowledge of the existence
of negligence, when the plaintiff was unconscious. Therefore, the
defendant should be forced to defend his position. The fact that
some defendants were quite unlikely to have been parties to
the injury to the patient does not seem to have bothered the
court.22 This decision in effect has made the physician and all his
professional associates very nearly absolutely liable for injuries
to any patient rendered unconscious by general anesthesia.
Decisions in cases involving spinal anesthesia have taken an
unusual turn in California. In this procedure the patient usually
(Continued from preceding page)
denying him all reasonable opportunity to recover for negligent harm. It is
rather a good reason for re-examination of the state of legal theories which
supposedly compel such a shocking result.
'We do not at this time undertake to state the extent to which the
reasoning of this case may be applied to other situations in which the doc-
trine of res ipsa loquitur is invoked. We merely hold that where a plaintiff
receives unusual injuries while unconscious and in the course of medical
treatment, all those defendants who had any control over his body or the
instrumentalities which might have caused the injuries may properly be
called upon to meet the inference of negligence by giving an explanation
of their conduct.'" Ybarra v. Spangard, 25 Calif. 2d 486, 154 P. 2d 687, 162
A. L. R. 1258 (1944).
22 "We have no doubt that in a modem hospital, a patient is likely to come
under the care of a number of persons in different types of contractual and
other relationships with each other. It may appear at the trial that, con-
sistent with the principles outlined above, one or more defendants would be
found liable and others absolved, but this should not preclude the application
of the rule of res ipsa loquitur. This places upon them the burden of initial
explanation." In summation, the court said, "We merely hold that when a
plaintiff receives unusual injuries while unconscious and in the course of
medical treatment, all those defendants who had any control over his body
or the instrumentalities which might have caused the injuries may properly
be called upon to meet the inference of negligence by giving an explanation
of their conduct." Ybarra case, above, n. 21.
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is not rendered unconscious. By means of a spinal needle, anes-
thetic agents are injected into the subarachnoid space, producing
analgesia of the lower trunk and legs. Inasmuch as many people
have an intense fear of spinal analgesia, it is not surprising that
there are a growing number of malpractice cases involving spinal
analgesia. A patient does not relish the pain of piercing the skin
of his back, nor the snapping sensation as the longitudinal liga-
ment is pierced, or the sudden twinge of pain as the posterial
nerve roots are touched by the spinal needle. To many patients
this procedure is an unnecessary invasion of a very vital part of
his nervous system. Any post-operative discomforts, together
with emotional elements, may result in legal entanglements and
may cause the anesthesiologist to doubt the medical indications
for spinal analgesia. In Ohio,23 the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur
was held to be inapplicable in a case in which a spinal needle
broke while the anesthesiologist was administering the spinal
anesthetic agent. The court declared that just because a spinal
needle broke while in the back of the patient, negligence need
23 "... While the breaking of the needle in the instant case does not permit
the application of the rule of evidence known as res ipsa loquitur, never-
theless the breaking of the needle under the circumstances, coupled with
its location, outside of the channel of soft tissues and against the bone, as
shown by the x-ray film gives rise to a prima facie case of negligence, suf-
ficient to call upon the Defendant Michaels for explanation. And although
while it may be that the anesthetist followed approved custom, in his
attempt to administer the anesthetic, nevertheless custom alone, will not
exonerate one from a charge of negligence.
"... When the physician, acting in concert with another in the per-
formance of an operation, perpetrates an act of malpractice, the other may
be held liable for the acts of the tort feasor if he observes such tortious
conduct and lets it continue without objection, or if he fails to observe and
act upon that which, in the exercise of ordinary care and diligence under
the circumstances, he should have observed and acted upon." Wiley v.
Wharton, 68 Ohio App. 345, 41 N. E. 2d 255 (1941).
".... While conformity to a custom and usage is a matter proper to be
submitted to the jury for its consideration in determining whether or not
ordinary care has been exercised, customary methods or conduct do not
furnish a test which is conclusive or contracting on the question of negli-
gence or fix a standard by which negligence is to be gauged. Methods em-
ployed in any trade, business or profession, however long continued cannot
avail to establish as safe in law that which is dangerous in fact." Ault v.
Hall, 119 Ohio St. 422, 164 N. E. 518, 60 A. L. R. 128 (1928).
The res ipsa loquitur doctrine is not applicable in malpractice cases in-
volving diagnosis and scientific prescription, cannot be invoked in aid of
specific charges of negligence, and is inapplicable where complaint alleges
and plaintiff affirmatively shows how his injuries occurred. Sieling v.
Mahrer, 71 Ohio L. A. 571, 113 N. E. 2d 373 (1953).
Where the patient selected the hospital at which operation was to be
performed and hospital prepared patient for operation and furnished all
accessories including chemicals required in operation, and its employees
applied the chemicals, the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur was not applicable to
attribute negligence to the surgeon. Blackman v. Zeligs, 90 Ohio App. 304,
470 Ohio 393, 103 N. E. 2d 13 (1951).
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not necessarily be inferred. It is incumbent on the plaintiff
affirmatively to prove negligence.
In another instance,24 spinal analgesia was administered to a
patient undergoing an emergency operation. When the spinal
needle was inserted into the subarachnoid space, the patient ex-
perienced a terrific pain that radiated down the right leg. He
stiffened, screamed, and .fainted. When he awoke the next morn-
ing, the plaintiff's leg was partially paralyzed. A neurologist
testified that such a painful reaction was a common experience,
and that the plaintiff suffered an injury to the nerve roots in the
lower end of the spinal cord. Testimony ascribed the cause to
the inherently toxic quality of the injected drug, as distinguished
from the negligence of the anesthesist. The doctrine of res ipsa
loquitur was held not to apply.
In a more recent decision in the State of California,25 the
Supreme Court held that the rule of res ipsa loquitur applied in
a similar factual situation. The plaintiff had been given a spinal
anesthesia for childbirth delivery. In the first days postpartum,
the plaintiff complained of pain and difficulty in moving the legs;
and pain in the back, neck, head, arms, and wrists. By the fourth
day postpartum, she could flex the right leg but had no control
over the left foot. After two months in the hospital, she had re-
gained the use of the right leg. The anesthesiologist testified that
he had performed the lumbar puncture at L 4-5 (the fourth and
fifth lumbar interspace) and had administered the usual anes-
thetic agents in the usual dosage. He then explained that occa-
sional sensitivity to these agents occurs in a few isolated cases.
The Court of Appeals20 said, "the law has never held a physician
or surgeon liable for every untoward result which may occur in
medical practice."
However, upon appeal, the Supreme Court of California de-
clared it a nonsuit and granted a new trial, stating: "It would
appear that the plaintiffs have made out a prima facie case by
both medical testimony and common knowledge that the injuries
are not such as usually occur in the circumstances without negli-
24 Ayers v. Parry, 192 F. 2d 181 (C. A., N. J., 1951).
"Seldom, indeed, would physicians administer a spinal anesthetic if
they are to be held responsible solely for an adverse reaction of the anes-
thetic on the nerve roots."
For a thorough discussion of proper rules, on a most enlightened scien-
tific basis, see, Hall v. United States, 136 F. Supp. 187 (D. C., La., 1955).
25 Seneris v. Hass, 281 P. 2d 278 (Calif., 1955), Modified on appeal, 291
P. 2d 915 (1955).
26 Citing, Huffman v. Lindquist, 37 Cal. 2d 465, 473, 234 P. 2d 34 (1951).
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gence on the part of someone." The court was convinced from
the expert testimony of the obstetrician that in the absence of
negligence such injuries do not occur, and from the neurosurgeon
that the injury resulted from damage to the spinal cord per se.
It is significant that either they disregarded or disbelieved
the testimony of the anesthesiologist, who testified that the
lumbar puncture-although performed in a hurry (and what
spinal anesthetic induction for delivery isn't!)-was performed
at L 4-5. Unless the patient has a most unusual congenital defect,
the possibility of injuring the spinal cord at that level is ex-
tremely remote.27 It is common knowledge, at least among anes-
thesiologists, that the cord per se seldom extends below the body
of the first lumbar vertebra. The possibility of touching or injur-
ing the filaments of the cauda equina (the roots of the lumbar,
sacral and coccygeal nerves) are a hazard inherent to the pro-
cedure, or constitute the "calculated risk." If all of the anes-
thesiologist's testimony as to the technique he used is true, he
used the technique that is used for spinal anesthesia in the
majority of the hospitals in our country. It is submitted that, in
this case, the State of California has, for all intents and purposes,
required the anesthesiologist when employing spinal anesthesia
to be a guarantor of treatment.
The effects of these decisions upon the practice of anes-
thesiology in the State of California have been profound. Since
the physician-anesthetist now is liable as a guarantor of results
(partly, perhaps, under the "deep pocket doctrine"), his judg-
ment in selection of a type of anesthesia may be influenced by
his legal liability. This is particularly true for private practition-
ers, as contrasted with the large university hospitals. The follow-
ing are statements as to this effect, from anesthesiologists cur-
rently in practice in the State of California: 2
"*... Spinals have been avoided except for clear cut
indications."
"Complications under general anesthesia frequently offer
no legal threat whereas those related to spinal anesthesia are
extremely hazardous in this respect."
27 Southworth and Hingson, Conduction Anesthesia, J. 3. Lippincott Co.
(1946) p. 738; Vandam, Leroy D. & Driggs, Robert D., Longterm Follow-up
of patients who received 10,098 Spinal Anesthetics. 161 J. A. M. A. 586
(1956); Note, 156 J. A. M. A. 1486 (1954); Note, Modern Medicine, 110 (May
15, 1955).
28 Personal communications, in several statistical inquiries made by the
writer.
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"Today, unlike the situation a few years ago, we seldom
ever have a request from the surgeon for spinal anesthesia."
The influence of these decisions is graphically illustrated in
medical statistics.
Per cent
of cases o------o Private practice group CalIfornia
40o 0-.o University Hospital Oalifornia
9e- Private practice group Eastern
35- University Hospital Eastern
30-
25-
20-
15-
to-
II I I I I I .
1950 51 52 53 54 55 56 57
Years
Use of spinal anesthesia in general surgery in the two
selected instances in California show a progressive decline in use
of spinal anesthesia. This contrasts sharply with the tendency in
hospitals in other sections of the country. The incidence of ad-
ministered spinal anesthesia in the latter institutions remains
constant, or is increasing.
Of particular interest is the reaction of the anesthesiologist
in private practice, concerning use of spinal anesthesia. This
physician is most sensitive to the possibility of the legal entangle-
ments. He does not feel the cloak of institutional protection about
him. In fact, he usually considers himself more vulnerable to the
sting of the "deep pocket doctrine" of liability. He fears that his
reputation may be seriously damaged if a suit is filed against him
for malpractice. It is evident, therefore, that the decisions of the
California courts in regard to spinal anesthesia are now seriously
affecting his selection of anesthesia.
It is a sad commentary on court misunderstanding of scien-
tific facts, when a physician must deny the patient the advantages
11Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 1957
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of a particular type of anesthesia because of the possibility of a
malpractice suit. Yet such is the present situation in the State
of California, where the recent court decisions practically hold
the physician strictly liable for untoward results.
It all began 100 years ago, when a barrel of flour fell in a
warehouse and a learned justice spoke those catchy words in
Latin: Res ipsa loquitur! It came to its "Alice In Wonderland"
peak in California-land of the-incredible-come-true.
12https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol6/iss3/8
